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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTALISM: AN INTRODUCTION
KEVIN C. WALSH*
ABSTRACT
This Article introduces the idea of judicial departmentalism and
argues for its superiority to judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy
is the idea that the Constitution means for everybody what the
Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Judicial depart-
mentalism, by contrast, is the idea that the Constitution means in the
judicial department what the Supreme Court says it means in
deciding a case. Within the judicial department, the law of judg-
ments, the law of remedies, and the law of precedent combine to
enable resolutions by the judicial department to achieve certain kinds
of settlements. Judicial departmentalism holds that these three
bodies of law provide the exclusive ways in which constitutional
adjudication gives rise directly to binding constitutional law. This
Article argues that our Justices should be judicial departmentalists
rather than judicial supremacists.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article introduces the idea of judicial departmentalism and
argues for its superiority to judicial supremacy. It contends that our
Justices should be judicial departmentalists rather than judicial
supremacists.
Judicial supremacy is the conventional designation for the idea
that the Constitution means for everybody what the Supreme Court
says it means in deciding a case.1 Judicial departmentalism, by
contrast, is the idea that the Constitution means in the judicial de-
partment what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case.2
Within the judicial department, the law of judgments, the law of
remedies, and the law of precedent combine to enable resolutions by
the judicial department to achieve certain kinds of settlements.3 To
the extent that these judicial settlements remain undisturbed over
time, judicial departmentalism enables a type of judicial supremacy
to function as a practical matter. But this supremacy is legally
limited by the boundaries around judicial resolutions imposed by
the law of judgments, the law of remedies, and the law of
precedent.4 Judgments are generally limited to parties, injunctions
can be lifted, and precedents can be overturned, for example.5
Judicial departmentalism has not previously been presented as
a conceptual framework for thinking about the authoritativeness of
judicial determinations of constitutional law. But this Article argues
that it already is our law, and that the conventional view that
judicial supremacy is our law rests on much weaker foundations
than commonly thought. 
Part I quickly sets the stage for comparing judicial supremacy
and judicial departmentalism. It does so through an overview of the
1. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 455-56 (2000).
2. See Kevin C. Walsh, Combating Judicial Supremacy Through Containment and
Conversion, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: MIRROR OF JUST. (Oct. 9, 2015), http://mirrorof
justice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/10/combating-judicial-supremacy-through-containment-
and-conversion.html [https://perma.cc/P6S9-CQ23].
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.
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better known of the two ideas: judicial supremacy. It first presents
the conventional doctrinal account of judicial supremacy’s place in
today’s constitutional law. It then sketches the two most prominent
normative arguments marshaled in support of the comparative
superiority of judicial supremacy. These are the settlement-function
argument for judicial supremacy6 and the collapse argument from
the instability of alternatives.7 The exposition in Part I operates
externally. It describes how nonjudicial officials are told they should
regard the authoritativeness of Supreme Court determinations of
constitutional law if they are judicial supremacists: as equivalent in
authority to the Constitution itself.8 
Part II provides an overview of judicial departmentalism. It oper-
ates from a detached perspective that describes how the bindingness
of judicial determinations is generally understood to arise within
our legal system through the law of remedies, the law of judgments,
and the law of precedent.
Part III argues for the comparative superiority of judicial depart-
mentalism to judicial supremacy. Its arguments are aimed at the
internal point of view of Supreme Court Justices deciding how they
should want the authoritativeness of their judicial determinations
of constitutional law to be accepted by others. 
I. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A SKETCH
There are three primary components to the case for judicial
supremacy.9 I sketch them out briefly in this Part but do not provide
full-blown renditions of the arguments. That has already been done
well by people who actually adhere to judicial supremacy and aim
to bring others into the fold. But because my case for judicial
departmentalism as comparatively superior to judicial supremacy
is, well, comparative, I begin by identifying some of the leading at-
tractions of judicial supremacy.
6. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1594, 1631-32 (2005) (book review); infra Part I.B.
7. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1610-11; infra Part I.C.
8. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376-77 (1997).
9. See generally id. at 1369-77 (providing an in-depth analysis of the three components
of the argument for judicial supremacy).
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A. “Judicial Supremacy Is the Law”
The first, and most obvious, argument for being a judicial
supremacist is that judicial supremacy is the law, and it is good to
follow the law.10
Conventional renditions of doctrine identify Cooper v. Aaron11 as
the Supreme Court’s decisive adoption of judicial supremacy into
constitutional law doctrine.12 This was the school desegregation case
out of Little Rock that the Supreme Court heard in a special session
in late summer 1958 after President Eisenhower sent federal troops
to enforce integration of Little Rock’s Central High School for the
1957 school year.13 In their decision agreeing with the NAACP that
further delay of school integration should not be permitted, the
Justices identified Brown v. Board of Education14 as the law of the
land on par with the Constitution itself.15
The Cooper Court purported to find in Marbury v. Madison16 the
principle that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution.”17 This principle, stated the opinion of
the Court, is “a permanent and indispensable feature of our consti-
tutional system.”18 And from this principle, “[i]t follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
10. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1630 (“[T]he Court essentially declared
that although both officials and citizens may believe that the Court’s interpretations are
incorrect, those interpretations function as supreme law ... unless and until the Court itself
repudiates them.”).
11. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
12. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 579, 600 (2003) (citing Cooper v. Aaron as authority for the claim that “the Supreme
Court simply is the one and only boss of the country when it comes to deciding the content and
bearing of constitutional law”).
13. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12 (“On September 25, [1957,] ... the President of the United
States dispatched federal troops to Central High School and admission of the Negro students
to the school was thereby effected. Regular army troops continued at the high school until
November 27, 1957. They were then replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who
remained throughout the balance of the school year.”).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”).
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
18. See id. This opinion was signed, personally, by the Chief Justice and each of the
Associate Justices.
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Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI
of the Constitution makes it of binding effect ... ‘any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.’”19 
In more recent years, City of Boerne v. Flores and the Court’s
Section 5 case law more generally rest on a similar equation.20 In
Boerne, the Supreme Court held the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) unconstitutional as applied to state and local govern-
ments because the statute exceeded Congress’s enforcement auth-
ority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.21 Congress
enacted the RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Employment Division v. Smith22 that the Free Exercise Clause did
not authorize judicially created exemptions from neutral and gen-
erally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise.23
In the few decades preceding Smith, the Court had purported to
apply a more religion-protective test, and Congress sought by stat-
ute to restore a version of that test.24 The Supreme Court held that
Congress could not do this using its Section 5 authority because
substitution of the earlier approach could not be understood as
enforcing the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.25
Although the Court divided on other grounds in Boerne, no Justice
dissented from the majority’s analytical framework equating the
Free Exercise Clause and Smith.26
Anyone interested in understanding judicial supremacy must also
pay special attention to the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.27 This was the case in which
the Court reaffirmed a constitutional right to abortion by preserving
19. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). Dispelling any doubt about the intended equa-
tion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown with the Constitution itself, Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion for the Court continues: “Every state legislator and executive and judicial
officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 ‘to support this Con-
stitution.’” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3).
20. See 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
21. See id. at 536.
22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-13; Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
24. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-14. 
25. See id. at 534-36.
26. See id. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id.
at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. See 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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what it called “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade.”28 The control-
ling plurality opinion does not equate the Court’s opinions with the
Constitution; it even professes some doubt about whether Roe v.
Wade was rightly decided.29 But the opinion raises the stakes even
higher. It says that the American people’s “belief in themselves” as
“a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law ...
is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and
speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.”30 This is
judicial supremacy on steroids.
B. The Settlement Function of Law
The leading normative defense of judicial supremacy is based on
the settlement function of law.31 A well-developed and prominent
account of the settlement-function argument for judicial supremacy
has been provided by Professors Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer
in coauthored law review articles.32 
Professors Alexander and Schauer explain that law provides the
benefits of authoritative settlement and of coordinating social
behavior.33 These benefits provide reasons for following laws even
when one disagrees with the content of those laws, for even mistak-
en laws serve settlement and coordination functions.34 Alexander
and Schauer contend that the benefits of settlement and coordina-
tion provided by stare decisis doctrine within the judicial domain
are also provided by applying a norm of deference to prior Supreme
Court determinations outside the judiciary as well.35 This settlement
28. See id. at 846. 
29. See id. at 853 (“[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central hold-
ing of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with
the force of stare decisis.”).
30. Id. at 868.
31. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1371-72.
32. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 1; Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8.
33. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1371-72.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1373-74 (discussing the applicability of stare decisis as set forth in Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), to the nonjudicial branches of government).
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function, they argue, is particularly important for constitutional law
“because the Constitution governs all other law.”36
To achieve the benefits of settlement and coordination over time,
Professors Alexander and Schauer argue that “the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the Constitution should be taken by all other
officials, judicial and non-judicial, as having an authoritative status
equivalent to the Constitution itself.”37 They acknowledge that “‘the
Constitution is what the judges say it is,’ may well be bad jurispru-
dence because it is incomprehensible as an attempt to explain what
it means to argue to the Supreme Court,” but they maintain that “it
is nonetheless a desirable attitude for non-judicial officials to have
towards the Court and its product, in much the same way, but far
less controversially, that it is a desirable attitude for lower court
judges to have towards the Court and its opinions.”38
Professors Alexander and Schauer recognize that contestation
over constitutional meaning can be not only legitimate but also ben-
eficial, at least en route to authoritative resolution by the Supreme
Court.39 But once the Supreme Court has resolved a contest over
constitutional meaning, the Court’s determination is to be treated
by extrajudicial officials the same way that it is to be treated by
lower court judges.40 Officials remain free to express disagreement
and to argue why the Supreme Court’s decision is wrong. But they
cannot engage in an act of official resistance.41 In their official
actions, nonjudicial officials are duty-bound to follow the Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the Supreme Court, not the Constitution as
the officials themselves see it.42
36. Id. at 1377.
37. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 1, at 455.
38. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Charles Evan Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira
Chamber of Commerce (May 2, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
133 (1908)).
39. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 8, at 1385 n.98 (defending interjurisdictional
non-deference).
40. See id. at 1387.
41. Alexander and Schauer describe the position that they challenge as “non-deference.”
See id. at 1362 (“Non-deference occurs when a nonjudicial official who disagrees with a
judicial decision on a constitutional question does not conform her actions to that decision and
perhaps even actively contradicts it.”).
42. See id. at 1381 n.90 (arguing that, because judicial officials can be expected to
subjugate their own interpretations of the Constitution to the judgment of the Supreme Court,
“there is nothing more anti-textual about expecting nonjudicial officials to show the same
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C. The Collapse Argument Against Departmentalism
A competitor approach to judicial supremacy is department-
alism.43 This comes in a variety of forms.44 For present purposes, we
can consider “Lincoln-Meese” departmentalism, thus named because
President Abraham Lincoln advanced this version of departmental-
ism in response to the Dred Scott case and because former Attorney
General Edwin Meese championed it in the 1980s.45 Lincoln-Meese
departmentalists accept vertical stare decisis within the judiciary
and also agree that judgments and remedies may bind those outside
the judiciary.46 But, they hold, nonjudicial officials are not bound by
Supreme Court opinions themselves, and these officials do not
violate their oath to the Constitution by following the Constitution
as they see it rather than the Constitution as the Court sees it.47
Professors Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum view the pri-
mary defect of Lincoln-Meese departmentalism to be its instability.48
If the Supreme Court renders a constitutional interpretation that
the other branches disagree with, “Congress might continue passing
laws of the type that the Court has held unconstitutional,” and
“[t]he President may order the executive branch to continue
enforcing laws the Court has held to be unconstitutional.”49 But the
courts will vindicate those against whom the laws are enforced if
there are lawsuits, and “it is child’s play to get almost all constitu-
tional questions about which there is interbranch disagreement into
the form of a lawsuit fit for judicial resolution.”50 
Once these issues get into the courts, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation “will ultimately prevail” over the other branches’
interpretations “unless the Supreme Court changes its mind about
its own constitutional interpretations.”51 The argument comes to
deference”).
43. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1599, 1609-10.
44. See, e.g., id. at 1609-10 (introducing the distinction between “divided departmental-
ism” and “overlapping departmentalism”).
45. See id. at 1614-15.
46. See id. at 1614.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1614-15.
49. Id. at 1614.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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this: because judicial supremacy “will emerge from Lincoln-Meese
... departmentalism, though only through the very time-consuming
and costly process of litigating each act of resistance to the Court’s
interpretation,” judicial supremacy is normatively superior to
Lincoln-Meese departmentalism.52
II. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTALISM
This Part describes judicial departmentalism as an alternative to
judicial supremacy. The basic idea behind it is the same claim that
leads the case for judicial supremacy: judicial departmentalism is
the law. Judicial departmentalism equates the authoritativeness of
Supreme Court declarations of constitutional law with the authori-
tativeness of all other Supreme Court declarations of law. 
Although the Supreme Court occasionally speaks as if judicial
supremacy is the law,53 reflection on the activity of constitutional
adjudication reveals that judicial departmentalism is the law. What
the Justices say and do both matter. But some of what they
occasionally say contrasts with what they consistently do. The
Justices’ occasional professions of judicial supremacy contrast with
their pervasive judicial departmentalism.
We shall first look at this pervasive judicial departmentalism in
practice, and then return to its significance for the Justices’
occasional professions of judicial supremacy. And we begin, as every
federal court’s consideration of a case should begin, with jurisdic-
tion.
A. Jurisdiction, the Law of Remedies, and the Law of Judgments
Jurisdiction is essential for everything that federal judges do.
Like all other federal judges, the Justices of the Supreme Court
insist on possessing jurisdiction before they act. This is a strict
requirement. The Court will dismiss a jurisdictionally deficient case
52. Id. at 1614-15. While Professors Alexander and Solum formulate this collapse argu-
ment in opposition to Lincoln-Meese departmentalism specifically, it applies to any position
that authorizes the sort of resistance to Supreme Court determinations of constitutional
meaning that can result in litigation.
53. See supra Part I.A.
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as improvidently granted even after it has been fully briefed and
argued, for example, and even though the questions presented by
the case need to be resolved to bring uniformity to the resolution of
many other cases presenting the same questions.54 That kind of
waste in service of jurisdictional maintenance is just one manifesta-
tion, specific to the Supreme Court, of the recognition that a federal
court simply cannot act on a matter without jurisdiction.55 
Jurisdiction comes in two varieties: jurisdiction over a particular
subject matter, and jurisdiction over a person or thing. For federal
courts, subject-matter jurisdiction has both constitutional and
statutory limits. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution specifies
the limited categories of cases to which the federal judicial power
extends.56 And Congress has further specified the subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal courts by statute. Apart from the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, which is self-executing, a federal court
cannot act on a matter except in accordance with a statutory grant
of subject-matter jurisdiction.57 
The case or controversy requirement is another limitation on
federal court jurisdiction.58 The law implementing this requirement
is voluminous and detailed.59 But for present purposes, we can focus
on just the third prong of the standing requirement. To be able to
seek relief from a federal court, a litigant must have (1) an injury,
(2) that is traceable to a defendant’s actions, and (3) remediable by
the court.60 This last requirement, that the standing-conferring in-
jury be one remediable by the court, points us directly to what the
federal courts are necessarily in the business of doing when engaged
in adjudication: providing remedies. 
54. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 541 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2004).
55. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1998).
56. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the constitutional scope of the judicial power).
57. See James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-
Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 558 n.12 (1994).
58. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed
Solution to the Serious (But Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1373, 1380-83 (2014).
59. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 2 (6th ed. 2009).
60. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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A remedy can be understood expansively as “anything a court can
do for a litigant who has been wronged or is about to be wronged.”61
The range of remedies is broad, including money damages, injunc-
tions, and declaratory judgments, as well as more specific relief
provided by writs of habeas corpus or mandamus, for example.
Although broad, the range of remedies is not unbounded. The law
of remedies limits the scope of permissible remedies and prescribes
the conditions under which various remedies are appropriate.62 For
instance,
[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.63
It would be a legal error if a court were to order the remedy of a
preliminary injunction if one or more of these requirements were
not met. And this is but one example of what I mean by saying that
the law of remedies limits the scope of permissible remedies. If you
want to know whether a remedy should have been ordered, or
whether it was overbroad, and so on, you look to the law of reme-
dies. 
By building “remediability” into the standing inquiry, our law
focuses the front end of a case so that the result is the right kind of
judicial output at the back end. But standing doctrine is not the only
doctrine that connects remedies and jurisdiction in constitutional
litigation. The two also connect through the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction. 
Personal jurisdiction is conceptually and practically unimportant
when constitutional adjudication is defensive—that is, when some-
one is being prosecuted or sued and is arguing that the prosecution
or suit is unconstitutional. By the time a court needs to decide
whether to give effect to an allegedly constitutional law, it is already
well past questions of personal jurisdiction and it is obvious that the
question of whether to give effect to the allegedly unconstitutional
61. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2012).
62. See id. at 1-3.
63. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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law is in service of a determination about the respective legal rights
of persons. But personal jurisdiction is conceptually important when
constitutional adjudication is offensive—that is, when someone is
bringing suit to have a law rendered unenforceable by the defendant
official against the plaintiff.
A typical setting for offensive constitutional adjudication is a
preenforcement action for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute. As a prac-
tical matter, personal jurisdiction over the defendant is rarely a
contested issue because the defendant in these preenforcement suits
is the official with enforcement authority in the relevant jurisdic-
tion.64 But the idea of personal jurisdiction is important conceptu-
ally because the necessity of having personal jurisdiction over the
defendant demonstrates the in personam nature of the litigation.
And that is important because courts tend to lose sight of this
feature of constitutional litigation when it comes to describing their
authority with respect to allegedly unconstitutional statutes. 
To put the point bluntly, courts often speak as if preenforcement
constitutional adjudication puts the statute itself as a thing or res
before the court.65 The plainest example of this sort of speech is the
metaphor of severance and excision—conceptual operations per-
formed on the statute itself as a thing.66 But constitutional litigation
of the sort that I have been describing does not involve the statute
as a res. It is in personam litigation in which the court is asked to
decide the respective rights and duties of persons under law. If the
plaintiff ’s preenforcement challenge is successful, the remedy issued
runs against the defendant as a person. Declaratory relief will
subsist between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the defendant
will be subject to an injunction not to enforce the statute.
Attention to these structural features of constitutional adjudica-
tion reveals why Professor Richard Fallon was correct to state that
all constitutional adjudication is “as applied.”67 Because of the
64. The defendant in these cases is typically a person rather than an entity because states
possess sovereign immunity while enforcement officials can be sued pursuant to Ex parte
Young to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
65. See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 746 n.29, 747
(2010).
66. See id. at 745-46.
67. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-
Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1337, 1368 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, As-Applied
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structure of constitutional adjudication in the United States, federal
courts do not issue judgments about statutes themselves but rather
about the obligations and authority of persons under statutes.68
When federal courts reach decisions in constitutional cases at the
trial court level, the binding effect of those decisions is a function of
the binding effect of the judgment in the case, together with
whatever remedy a court has issued.69 On our list of ways in which
adjudication results in legally binding determinations, then, we
need to include the law of judgments, or preclusion doctrine.70 In
some ways, this is the most fundamental way that adjudication re-
sults in legally binding determinations. As Professor William Baude
has helpfully put it, the judicial power is the judgment power.71
This is not the place for a full rendition of the law of judgments.
But a glance at the Table of Contents for the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments provides a sense of what kind of law this is. The
chapter headings include “Validity of Judgments,” “Former Adjudi-
cation: The Effects of a Judicial Judgment,” “Parties and Other
Persons Affected by Judgments,” “Special Problems Deriving from
the Nature of Forum Rendering Judgment,” and others.72 Section
headings include “Requisites of a Valid Judgment,” “Subject Matter
Jurisdiction,” “The Scope of ‘Claim,’” “Issue Preclusion,” “Effect of
Declaratory Judgment,” “Effect of Criminal Judgment in a Subse-
quent Civil Action,” and “Effect of Federal Court Judgment in a
Subsequent Action,” among others.73 As these headings suggest, the
law of judgments is both highly refined and legally dense. But it is
and Facial Challenges]. In a later article, Professor Fallon describes certain aspects of his
earlier analysis as erroneous. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Chal-
lenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 917-22 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon, Fact and Fiction]. But he
stands by the proposition that “all challenges are as-applied challenges” in that “all constitu-
tional challenges to a rule of law—whether denominated as as-applied or facial—begin with
a challenger who maintains that the Constitution forbids the enforcement of that rule against
her.” Id. at 923.
68. See Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 67, at 1334. For an account
of the confusion and disarray that can follow from neglecting this aspect of constitutional
adjudication, see, for example, Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of
Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243 (2016).
69. See Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 67, at 923 n.31.
70. Cf. Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 67, at 1339-40.
71. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1808-09, 1811, 1845
(2008).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, table of contents (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
73. Id.
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the place we look at the back-end of litigation, when it is over, to
identify the legally binding nature of determinations made in a case. 
B. The Law of Precedent
Joining company with the law of judgments and the law of
remedies is a third body of law on our list of law that defines the
boundaries of legally binding determinations. This law applies only
with respect to the decisions of appellate courts. It is the law of
precedent, or stare decisis doctrine.
Stare decisis has both vertical and horizontal dimensions.74
Vertical stare decisis refers to the binding effect of higher-court
judgments on courts beneath that higher court in the judicial
hierarchy.75 Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, for example, are binding on federal district courts in
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina. Horizontal stare decisis refers to the binding effect of an
appellate court’s judgment at the same level in the judicial hierar-
chy.76 The rule that the decisions of one Fourth Circuit panel are
binding on later Fourth Circuit panels, for instance, is a rule of
horizontal stare decisis.
As a matter of legally binding effect, the biggest difference be-
tween decisions of the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and deci-
sions of inferior federal tribunals, on the other hand, arises not from
the law of judgments or the law of remedies, but rather from the law
of precedent. There is no tribunal higher than the Supreme Court
when it comes to questions of federal law, and all judicial tribunals
in the United States deciding a question of federal law must follow
the Supreme Court as a matter of vertical stare decisis.77 Notice the
limitation, though: “judicial tribunals.” Precedent does not bind
outside the judiciary.78 Because it binds within, precedent shapes
what can be plausibly argued and expected to happen in judicial
74. See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV.
112, 135 n.144 (2011) (explaining the distinction between vertical stare decisis and horizontal
stare decisis).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., id.
78. See, e.g., John Harrison, Essay, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50
DUKE L.J. 503, 509-13 (2000).
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tribunals. But nonjudicial actors are not bound by precedent the
way that judicial actors are.79
This legal distinction may not seem that practically important.
But it can be. Every good lawyer knows that precedents have vary-
ing degrees of strength and vitality. Our legal system’s development
of constitutional doctrine is influenced by forces analogous to
momentum and inertia in the physical world.80 The composition of
the Supreme Court, and the federal judiciary more generally,
changes. For any number of reasons, the law as formulated in
yesterday’s judicial opinions will not necessarily be the law formu-
lated in tomorrow’s. For intrasystemic reasons, lower court judges
are not as free as potential and actual litigants to act as if a
particular doctrine is no longer “good law” even though that doctrine
appears to be on its last legs. But those outside the judiciary who
know that the obituary of that doctrine has already been written, for
example, violate no rule of law by acting as if it is already dead. This
includes, by the way, executive officials and other government
actors, such as legislators, considering whether to enact a law that
would be unconstitutional under a precedent that looks vulnerable
but has not yet been overruled. The point is that lower court judges
are differently situated from everyone else by being bound in a way
that those others are not.81
For those who believe we have a presumptive moral obligation to
follow the law of a reasonably just society, it also makes a moral
difference that precedent does not bind outside the judiciary. And
79. See id.
80. See generally Seth P. Waxman, Essay, The Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New
Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2399-40 (2000) (discussing the idea of constitutional physics).
81. Although generally accepted, the understanding that inferior courts deciding questions
of federal law are bound by Supreme Court precedent is not universally accepted. The leading
scholarly critic of this view is Michael Stokes Paulsen, who has argued that lower court judges
are not bound by the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations and should repudiate
them when clearly erroneous. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations
on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82-88 (1989). There
are several strands to Paulsen’s argument, and this symposium Article is not a fitting place
to address them in full. One of Paulsen’s key moves is to argue from the lower court judges’
oath, which is to follow the Constitution, not the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Constitution. See id. at 82-83. Paulsen does not explain, though, why the displacement of de
novo lower court interpretation by vertical stare decisis is impermissible while displacement
by operation of some other rule of law, such as waiver or res judicata, remains permissible.
In any event, if Professor Paulsen is right, it would still remain the case that Supreme Court
precedents would not bind outside the judiciary.
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this moral difference, in turn, can lead to any number of practical
differences. A legislator who reasonably believes that the Supreme
Court has incorrectly decided a question of constitutional law may
be morally free to vote for legislation incompatible with Supreme
Court case law, for example.
C. Putting the Pieces Together
We can now put together the pieces that have thus far been laid
out to assemble the legal outlines of the world picked out by judicial
departmentalism. The law of judgments, the law of remedies, and
the law of precedent are three bodies of law that govern how judicial
determinations give rise to a kind of binding law.82 Judicial depart-
mentalism is the view that these three bodies of law provide the
exclusive ways by which constitutional adjudication gives rise to
binding constitutional law.
Put another way, a judicial determination can bind in three ways:
as a judgment; as a remedy; and as a precedent. Judgments create
obligations; their binding power is defined by the law of judgments
or preclusion doctrine. Courts order remedies; their permissible
scope is defined by the law of remedies. The decisions of appellate
courts create precedents; their force is set by the law of precedent,
or stare decisis doctrine. Judicial departmentalism holds that these
are the only three ways that judicial determinations give rise to
legally binding authority about the meaning of the Constitution.
Judicial supremacy claims there is another way, namely that the
Supreme Court’s opinions about the meaning of the Constitution are
themselves binding law for everyone as of the moment of deci-
sion—as binding as the Constitution itself. These opinions are not
only binding law from the moment they are made; they also remain
so, undiminished, unless and until overturned. The purported
binding force of judicial supremacy exceeds that of judicial
departmentalism precisely insofar as it is not limited by the law of
judgments, or the law of remedies, or the law of precedent.
82. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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III. WHY AND HOW JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTALISM MATTERS
This Part explains how and why judicial departmentalism
matters. Its arguments are aimed at the internal point of view of
Supreme Court Justices considering how they should want the auth-
oritativeness of their judicial determinations of constitutional law
to be accepted by others. Appealing to this internal point of view,
this Part argues for the comparative superiority of judicial depart-
mentalism over judicial supremacy. 
The case for judicial departmentalism proceeds in three steps.
First, judicial departmentalism already is the law; it is rooted in the
truth about what constitutional adjudication actually is in our legal
system. Second, being self-aware about what constitutional adjud-
ication actually is enables the Justices to do it better and more
intelligently; judicial departmentalism focuses the Justices’ atten-
tion on a range of important considerations that might otherwise
receive insufficient attention. Third, conscious and explicit adoption
of judicial departmentalism will not require significant changes to
substantive doctrine.
A. Adjudication, Equilibration, and Implementation
By focusing on the peculiarly judicial manner in which constitu-
tional adjudication gives rise to binding constitutional law of various
types, judicial departmentalism highlights the distinctively judicial
nature of the outputs of constitutional adjudication. One sense in
which the outputs are distinctively judicial is that they bind within
the judicial department, either by one’s relationship to the judicial
department as a party, or as the subject or object of a remedy.83
There is also another, perhaps more important, sense in which
the outputs of constitutional adjudication are distinctively judicial.
That is the sense revealed by attending to the pervasive presence of
factors related to judicial role in the identification and articulation
of constitutional law in constitutional adjudication.
The content of constitutional law in constitutional adjudication is
shaped throughout by the judicial setting in which it becomes
83. See supra Part II.
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operative. It is sometimes analytically useful to distinguish justicia-
bility determinations from merits determinations, and these two
from remedial determinations, as phases of adjudication with
particular doctrines governing each.84 But the doctrines governing
decisions in any one of these “phases” are formulated and developed
with regard to the doctrines that govern in the other two. 
The name coined by Professor Richard Fallon for the way these
bodies of law develop interdependently is the Equilibration Thesis.85
This is the idea that “courts, and especially the Supreme Court,
decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall
alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights,
and available remedies.”86 With an eye on the acceptability of the
overall alignment of the doctrines in these three formally separate
areas, courts formulate doctrine in a way that reveals substantial
interdependencies among the categories. As Professor Fallon agues,
“when the Court dislikes an outcome or pattern of outcomes, it will
often be equally possible for the Justices to reformulate applicable
justiciability doctrine, substantive doctrine, or remedial doctrine.”87 
If the Equilibration Thesis is correct that “justiciability, substan-
tive, and remedial doctrines are substantially interconnected and
that courts frequently face a choice about which doctrine to adjust
in order to achieve acceptable results overall,”88 then it seems odd
to treat the meaning of the Constitution as equivalent with ju-
dicially formulated constitutional law. This is because the substan-
tive constitutional law announced by the courts has been shaped by
considerations related to justiciability and remedies.89 A sense of
what the courts deciding questions of constitutional law are for, and
of how far they can go in ordering affairs such that government
practice and constitutional meaning best align, informs these courts’
articulations of constitutional law. 
This observation has special force for the Supreme Court. The
Court’s expositions of constitutional law take place against a
84. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Reme-
dies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006).
85. Id. at 637.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 683.
89. Cf. id. at 646-47.
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backdrop understanding not only of the judicial role, but also of the
distinctive role of the Supreme Court and the expected contribution
of other courts to doctrinal elaboration. Thus situated, it makes
sense to think of the Court’s expositions of constitutional law as a
kind of law designed for application by, and within, the judicial
department—just as judicial departmentalism does.
Constitutional adjudication is not a stand-alone inquiry into the
content of constitutional law, but an institutionally situated,
distinctively judicial enterprise that unfolds over time. The consti-
tutional law that emerges from constitutional adjudication shares
these qualities: institutionally situated, distinctively judicial, and
temporally impressed. And equilibration—by which judges attend
to the overall alignment of justiciability, substantive, and remedial
doctrines, rather than any of these considered in themselves—is just
one component of what makes constitutional law distinctively
judicial.
Another important aspect of what makes constitutional law
distinctively judicial appears in the idea of constitutional implemen-
tation, as distinct from constitutional interpretation.90 The distinc-
tion is real because judicial exposition of constitutional law includes
not only inquiry into constitutional meaning (that is, interpreta-
tion), but also the fashioning of implementing doctrines to give legal
effect to that constitutional meaning in judicial settings.91 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, for example, has different
analytic tracks for discriminatory and nondiscriminatory legisla-
tion.92 Equal Protection Clause case law includes tiers of scrutiny,
as (sometimes) does substantive due process case law, to pick some
other easy examples.93 These tracks and tiers are not, themselves,
encoded into the Constitution, of course; they are used by judges as
a means of giving effect to the Constitution with some level of
stability, uniformity, and predictability.94
90. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, at ix (2001) (focusing
“attention on the role of Supreme Court Justices as practical lawyers, charged with
implementing the Constitution” by “developing ... workable doctrinal structure[s]” that give
legal effect to constitutional meaning but are not fully determined by it).
91. See id. at 41-42.
92. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
93. See FALLON, supra note 90, at 5-7.
94. See id.
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When determining “what kinds of doctrinal protections are neces-
sary, feasible, and appropriate,” the Justices not only appeal to legal
authorities, but also “draw on psychology, sociology, and economics
to craft doctrines that will work in practice, without excessive costs,
and that will prove democratically acceptable.”95 This includes
making “practical, predictive, and sometimes tactical judgments.”96
All of these inputs into our familiar doctrinal tests provide a
“valuable window on the Court’s understanding of its own role, and
of the limits of that role, within the constitutional scheme.”97 
In picking out equilibration and implementation as features of
judicial expositions of constitutional law here, I do not offer full
accounts of either concept. Instead, accepting them as accurate
accounts of what constitutional adjudication involves, I point toward
what acceptance of their truth should mean for one’s conception of
the constitutional law that results. The pervasive effects of role
considerations throughout the judicial practice of constitutional
adjudication mean that judges engaged in that practice, especially,
but not only, the Justices of the Supreme Court, do and should
operate as judicial departmentalists.
To observe that constitutional adjudication as it takes place in the
United States includes equilibration among justiciability, substance,
and remedies, as well as implementation and interpretation, is not
to untether external observation from how judges internally experi-
ence adjudication. To the contrary. The judicial role considerations
that shape judicial exposition of constitutional law are not gauzy
gestalt conceptions of what judges should do, but rather constella-
tions of views cashed out in concrete choices over time regarding the
full range of actual legal doctrines that define the federal judicial
role. In and through application of doctrines like standing, ripeness,
mootness, the political question doctrine, class certification require-
ments, statutory jurisdiction rules, court-made rules (such as
Supreme Court Rule 10 which governs the grant of certiorari),
procedural default rules, harmless error analysis, and so on, the
Justices and all other judges engaged in constitutional adjudication
95. Id. at 77.
96. Id. at 111.
97. Id. at 76.
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define the judicial role—and understand themselves to be doing
precisely that.
By taking the next step and situating this self-understanding
within the framework of judicial departmentalism, judges—especial-
ly the Justices of the Supreme Court—can adjudicate questions of
constitutional law more intelligently. The main contribution made
to constitutional adjudication by judges’ conscious adoption of
judicial departmentalism would be to align ought with is. Judges
should be judicial departmentalists because the constitutional law
formulated by the judicial department is a particular kind of law to
be applied within the judicial department. 
Suppose, though, that one finds this jurisprudential claim wrong
or unpersuasive or uninteresting. There remain many practical
benefits to the self-conscious adoption of judicial departmentalism,
which are discussed in the next Part. 
B. The Benefits of Self-Aware Judicial Departmentalism 
The precise practical effects that self-conscious judicial depart-
mentalism would have on constitutional law are impossible to
identify with any detail. But there is good reason to believe that
explicit adoption of judicial departmentalism could nevertheless
have major beneficial effects on the development of constitutional
doctrine going forward. That is because judicial departmentalism
goes directly to the self-conception of the Justices as they inhabit
their judicial role. That self-conception, in turn, influences the kinds
of opinions they write and the kinds of settlements those opinions
can, and cannot, accomplish.98 To the extent that unstable settle-
ments invite further litigation, judicial departmentalism points
toward the use of the regular tools of legal settlement—judgments,
remedies, and precedents—rather than a more insistent emphasis
on obedience.
98. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 40 (2006).
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1. Judicial Audience and the Dual Nature of Supreme Court
Opinions
One direct effect of the Justices’ adoption of judicial depart-
mentalism would be on their opinion writing. Much of what they
accomplish in constitutional adjudication is accomplished through
writing. As anyone who writes for a living knows, the relationship
between writer and audience matters a great deal to what is
written, and how. Judges are no exception.99 In particular, the
writer’s understanding of the kind of writing one is doing for one’s
audience influences both style and substance.100
Judicial opinions have multiple audiences.101 A judicial depart-
mentalist recognizes that the relationship between an appellate
court and the others within the judicial department subject to its
jurisdiction differs from the court’s relationship to those outside the
judicial department. This recognition, in turn, affects how the
author of an appellate court opinion writes it.102 
For judicial opinions, many of these potential effects have been
previously identified by Professor Thomas Merrill, who has
described the probable differences in the “style of judicial decision
making” under two different conceptions of judicial opinions:
opinions as binding law versus opinions as explanations and aid to
prediction.103 Professor Merrill argues that a court that adopts the
opinions-as-binding-law conception “will gravitate toward an
authoritarian style of decision making” because “[a] judiciary that
thinks its opinions are binding law is likely to be relatively indiffer-
ent to the views of the other branches about the meaning of the
law.”104 By contrast, a court that adopts the opinions-as-explana-
tions conception “will tend to view interpretation in more egalitar-
ian terms” based on the recognition that “someone else may come
along with a better or different explanation.”105
99. See id. at 46-47, 162-63.
100. See id. at 46-47.
101. Id. at 50.
102. See id. at 162-63.
103. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judg-
ments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 75-78 (1993).
104. Id. at 75.
105. Id.
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In further describing the differences that may flow from a change
in the style of judicial decision-making, Professor Merrill notes
Professor Robert Burt’s claim that “a Supreme Court that sees itself
as an authoritarian lawgiver is more likely to make major blunders
that exacerbate social tensions and damage its own institutional
reputation.”106 The Court’s handling of slavery and abortion, as well
as “the Court’s pre-New Deal effort to outlaw redistributive social
legislation,” according to Professors Merrill and Burt, fit this
description.107 Professor Merrill speculates that a court that op-
erates within an understanding of its opinions as explanations for
judgments rather than binding law “may be more modest about [its]
ability to coerce a solution to such intractable conflicts.”108
Another set of effects from adopting the opinions-as-explanations
approach that Professor Merrill identifies relates to judicial percep-
tions of the importance of predictability. Professor Merrill explains
that “[i]f the courts knew their decisions were viewed as only
predictive of future judgments, their ability to exert influence over
nonjudicial actors would depend on whether their future behavior
was predictable.”109 This would then lead courts to “try to assure
that their interpretations are ... perceived to be grounded in a
faithful interpretation of enacted law using conventional tools of
interpretation.”110 Courts would not only “try to assure that judicial
opinions are comprehensible,” but they would also “be forced to
adhere closely to their own past precedents.”111 
106. Id. at 76 (citing ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 193 (1992)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 76-77. Merrill also relies on James Bradley Thayer’s claim that “an author-
itarian style of legal interpretation may stultify the capacities of the politically accountable
institutions to engage in interpretation.” Id. at 77 (citing James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893)). As Richard
Posner has argued, however, Thayer’s claim rests on a seemingly unrealistic view of the
legislative process. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 519, 522 (2012). In any event, I place it aside because my focus here is on
effects on judicial actors rather than nonjudicial actors.
109. Merrill, supra note 103, at 77.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 77-78. In formulating this last point, Merrill relies on Professor Henry
Monaghan’s observation that “if the Supreme Court does not take its own opinions seriously,
eventually the rest of society will not either.” Id. at 78 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, Taking
Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979)).
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A judicial departmentalist Justice would adopt a both/and
approach to the two ways of understanding judicial opinions that
Professor Merrill distinguishes. With respect to hierarchically infer-
ior tribunals, opinions are binding law; with respect to everyone
else, the opinions-as-explanations conception controls. The contrast
should not be overdrawn, though. Even within the judicial depart-
ment, judicial opinions would be understood as a particular kind of
law, namely one that consists mostly of explanations and aids to
prediction.
Although Supreme Court opinions would not be understood as
binding law outside the judiciary, they would not be ignored.
Instead, they would be understood as the Court’s accounts for why
the Justices did what they did, which in turn can help predict what
they will do in the future. These opinions would possess the so-
ciological stickiness that comes from widespread acceptance of
whatever aspects of the opinion receive it, but no additional binding
legal force. And the persuasive force of the Court’s reasoning outside
the judiciary would remain important to nonjudicial actors for the
purposes of prediction and understanding. Those who anticipate
having to operate within the judicial domain as a party or other
participant would look to this doctrine for guidance, as would others
with a particular interest in the development of doctrine more
generally.
2. Bounded Legal Settlement
By marking the distinction between the binding authority of
judicial expositions of constitutional law within the judicial depart-
ment and their merely explanatory and predictive effects without,
judicial departmentalism identifies the limits of one type of legal
settlement—the kind that settles peremptorily. Parties may not be
satisfied with the judgment in their case, but res judicata is res
judicata. Those subject to an injunction may not wish to obey, but
disobedience can be punished by contempt sanctions. Lower courts
may disagree with Supreme Court doctrine, but they must work
within it, like it or not.
“Like it or not” settlements are not the only kind that can result
from legal determinations. Uneasy acquiescence, even in perceived
error, can provide settlement of another sort. So, too, can actual
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acceptance result as time reveals the inadequacy of alternatives
once perceived as better. 
Counterintuitive as it may initially appear, settlements of these
other kinds can be more enduring than “it’s the law, like it or not”
settlements. Judicial supremacy raises the stakes for Supreme
Court decisions, magnifying the effects of five-to-four rulings, for
example, and increasing pressure on the confirmation process for
new Justices. When all it takes to change the law is to change the
Justices, people who care about constitutional law will do all they
can to affect those changes. And the settlements that result from
Supreme Court decisions are only as lasting as the judicial coali-
tions that bring them about. 
Judicial departmentalism counsels a broader mindset than one
centered on the immediately and universally binding force of
Supreme Court decisions across the nation that judicial supremacy
claims. By foregrounding the limits of any particular legal settle-
ment as within the judicial department, it focuses judicial attention
on ways of ensuring stability over time for those kinds of settle-
ments. Justices who know that settlements will only endure as long
as the judicial department keeps providing the same answer, for
example, are more likely to provide answers the first time that are
likely to be appealing not solely to a bare majority of the current
Court, but also to unknown future Justices. They are also more
likely to explain the reasons for their opinions using methods of
justification that merit respectful consideration of their conclusions
as law even by those inclined to disagreement if considering the
same issue as a matter of policy.
For better or for worse, the Supreme Court has substantial dis-
cretion to shape the particular questions for decision in a particular
case before them. Concerned about the durability of their settle-
ments in the system of bounded judicial supremacy marked out by
judicial departmentalism, Supreme Court Justices might reasonably
aim at other legal desiderata beyond short-term, maximum
guidance. Consider the research finding that “opinions issued by
broad coalitions will experience, on average, a lower incidence of
negative treatment by subsequent courts.”112 Armed with this
112. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Bruce A. Desmarais, Standing the Test of Time: The
Breadth of Majority Coalitions and the Fate of U.S. Supreme Court Precedents, 4 J. LEGAL
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knowledge, the Justices might reasonably prefer a unanimous
decision settling some firm fundamentals in an area of the law while
leaving a substantial amount to be worked out in the future by
lower courts, over a vertically maximal, bare-majority decision that
settles more questions but with less stability.113 Think, for instance,
of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC recognizing the
“ministerial exception” for religious employers but leaving many of
the contours of the doctrine to continue to be worked out by lower
courts.114
3. Collapse into What? 
These considerations about the bounded nature of legal settle-
ments prompt reconsideration not only about the settlement argu-
ment for judicial supremacy, but also the argument based on the
instability of alternatives. This is the collapse argument: failure to
accept Supreme Court pronunciations of constitutional meaning as
authority on par with the Constitution itself will just bring people
into court; once brought into court, they will be brought into line; so
judicial supremacy will result, but only after strife and expense;
might as well have judicial supremacy from the get-go.115 
 Having considered the live possibility of judicial department-
alism as an alternative to judicial supremacy, however, the collapse
argument appears in a different light. More specifically, judicial
departmentalism provides a way for judges to operate effectively in
a world in which judicial supremacy itself collapses. As discussed in
more detail in the next Section, the Supreme Court has been most
explicitly insistent on judicial supremacy in areas of constitutional
law that have not shown significant stability over time.116 What
stability there has been has come from judgments, remedies, and
precedents, not from judicial supremacy. The judicial departmental-
ist would not be surprised at the practical inefficacy of claims of
judicial supremacy. Although there is a sense that judicial say-so
ANALYSIS 445, 448 (2012).
113. See id. at 447.
114. 565 U.S. 171, 193, 196 (2012).
115. Cf. Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1614-15.
116. See infra Part III.C.
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makes it so in constitutional law, our legal system has doctrines de-
fining boundaries around this say-so. The judicial departmentalist
relies on those doctrines and does not reach further into claiming
judicial supremacy. The law of judgments, the law of remedies, and
the law of precedent are enough in every other area of the law. Why
should constitutional law be any different?
Justices who know that their only tools for securing legal
settlement through adjudication are judgments, remedies, and
precedents are likely to judge in ways that lead to better judgments,
better remedies, and better precedents. The truth of this claim is
speculative, of course, and not susceptible of empirical demonstra-
tion. But it stands to reason that giving more careful consideration
on the front end to the kinds of remedies and precedents that will
result from one’s judgments will lead to better judgments, prece-
dents, and remedies. 
The legal settlement tools of the judicial departmentalist may not
seem as powerful as the blunt force of judicial supremacy. But for
that very reason they are more widely accepted by others who op-
erate from an internal point of view. And that should make judicial
departmentalism attractive for the Justices, who should want to
keep people playing the game that they referee. That is more likely
when players know that a “blown call” can be overturned later
rather than becoming the basis for a rule change.117
It is true that judicial departmentalism cedes constitutional turf
that judicial supremacy seemingly allows the Justices to occupy. But
the extent of their territory should not be the Justices’ only, or even
their primary, concern. They should also care, and care more, about
how secure their legal control of it is. And that depends, in part, on
the legitimacy of their claim to title.
The judicial supremacy that we have today has political founda-
tions.118 The Justices should accordingly worry less that they will be
117. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141-44 (2d ed. 1994) (differentiating scoring
errors from a rule of scorer’s discretion).
118. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 4
(2007); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002); Mark
A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993). For a complementary account of the federal foundations of judicial
supremacy, see Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Founda-
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allowed to occupy too little constitutional territory than that they
will be induced to occupy too much. The forces that make legislative
deferral and commitment-free position-taking attractive to political
actors can cause those actors to foist on the judiciary matters that
are not judicially resolvable in a way that appears more legal than
political.119 Human nature being what it is, the Justices might not
realize these gifts for what they really are. But the denizens of One
First Street, Northeast, need to be more discerning than the citizens
of Troy. These Trojan Horses do not spring open overnight. But over
time, judicial supremacy will result more and more in supremacy
that is less and less judicial. 
That is a big problem ... at least for any Justice who worries about
such things. And it should worry all of them. When judicial deci-
sions lose their legal appearance, their acceptance as law is jeopar-
dized. People may accept them out of habit or fear or indifference;
or perhaps because they are judicial supremacists as a matter of
political morality;120 or maybe they just want to be on the right side
of history. But all of that is different from accepting judicial
decisions as expositions of law. That is the kind of acceptance that
has traditionally justified treating the judicial resolution of a case
as establishing some kind of going-forward law (whether through
stare decisis, preclusion, or a remedy).121 The Justices either know
or should know that they imperil that traditional justification at
their own peril.
tion of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (2011).
119. See Graber, supra note 118, at 36-37.
120. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 118, at 8-9.
121. See Charles B. Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes
Unconstitutional, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 224, 230-31 (1890), explaining this point of view: 
Only a law-observing people will regard the decision of an action as equivalent
to the repeal or enactment of a law. The American people were a constitutional
people strongly imbued with the legal spirit.... They came from a race accus-
tomed to settling difficulties on legal lines.... All questions of liberty and freedom
have been argued as matters of law and not of expediency.... The people always
felt that if the law could but be discovered, it must necessarily be sufficient for
their protection. This legal spirit—this inborn habit of submission to law and the
consequent respect for the courts—is essential to the success of a federal system
of government; and when it exists, the prominence of the judiciary in the consti-
tution is assured. The law courts become the pivots upon which the constitu-
tional arrangements turn, and the judges become not only the guardians but the
masters of the constitution.
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In contrast with the political foundations of judicial supremacy,
judicial departmentalism has jurisdictional foundations. One could
take this one step further and point out that federal jurisdiction it-
self has political and structural foundations. But as Professor Tara
Grove has argued, our system contains structural safeguards
protecting federal jurisdiction from political attack.122 While the
political foundations of judicial supremacy are themselves subject
to collapse,123 the jurisdictional foundations are more secure. What
reason is there for a judiciary endowed with the jurisdictionally
grounded tools of judicial departmentalism to accept the politically
grounded power of judicial supremacy?
C. Revisiting Standard Supremacy Doctrine
We now return to where the case for both judicial supremacy and
judicial departmentalism began—with the law. “Judicial supremacy
is the law,” it has been said.124 And nowhere is this more insistently
urged than in connection with the Supreme Court’s desegregation
decisions. Cooper v. Aaron is the standard citation for judicial su-
premacy as our law.125 
“And judicial supremacy is good law,” it has been further said.126
What would we have done without judicial supremacy in a world in
which state and local officials, as well as private persons in vast
swaths of portions of the country, refused to accept Brown v. Board
of Education as the law of the land? Do the Supreme Court’s
desegregation decisions not show that judicial supremacy has to be
the law? 
Some version of these questions are the front line of defense for
judicial supremacists when challenged by judicial departmental-
ists.127 But in fact, the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions
122. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 869, 871 (2011).
123. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 118, at 24 (noting that the Court is more
vulnerable when a reconstructive President challenges its actions).
124. See supra Part I.A.
125. See 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Michelman, supra note 12, at 600 (citing Cooper v. Aaron
as the authority for the claim that the Supreme Court has the final say on the Constitution).
126. See generally Alexander & Schauer, supra note 1.
127. Indeed, one of the primary challenges raised by a leading law faculty member at my
symposium presentation for this Article took precisely this form.
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show the weakness of judicial supremacy in comparison with
judicial departmentalism. Judicial supremacists have reflexive re-
course to Cooper v. Aaron when challenged by judicial department-
alism. But what good did the Court’s claim (overclaim, really) of
judicial supremacy accomplish in Cooper v. Aaron?
In actuality, the Supreme Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy
was too little, too late—a sign of weakness more than anything else.
An oft-ignored reason the case ended up at the Supreme Court was
the Court’s own prior failures to provide guidance about how to
implement desegregation in elementary and secondary schools.128
People often speak of Brown v. Board of Education as a trans-
formative case, but when they do, they are usually thinking about
Brown I rather than Brown II.129 In Brown I, the Supreme Court
deferred all the hard questions about actual remedies for desegrega-
tion.130 And then in Brown II, the Court essentially delegated down
to district courts to figure out what to do with the (in)famous
guidance to proceed “with all deliberate speed.”131 
When one looks closely at the situation in Little Rock after Brown
and before Cooper v. Aaron, it is clear that the local school board in
Little Rock and the federal district court dealing with it were both
trying in good faith to desegregate the schools. Indeed, this comes
through in the Cooper opinion itself.132 They were stymied from
doing the right thing by state officials and others opposed to deseg-
regation, of course, but they were also weakened by vague guidance
from the Supreme Court.
If the problem is unclear guidance about what exactly Brown re-
quired, it certainly does very little help to simply continue to insist
that Brown is the law of the land. Insisting on judicial supremacy
compounds the problem rather than contributes to a solution.
128. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (failing to lay out any
specific remedies for desegregation), with Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955) (requiring vaguely that schools desegregate “with all deliberate speed”), and
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7 (stating that the Little Rock School Board intended to comply with
desegregation once the constitutional requirements were made clear).
129. See Denise Barnes, Remembering Desegregation Landmark, WASH. TIMES, May 18,
1994, at C14 (recognizing Brown I as the landmark decision that ended segregation in public
schools).
130. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
131. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
132. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8.
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Contrast what the Court actually did with what the Justices
would have done operating in a judicial departmentalist mindset.
The Justices would have known that their power to bind was only
as strong as their power to write clear precedents that supported
decisive judgments and specific remedies. They would have known
they could not rely on some unspecified power to just say what the
law is. They would have seen the folly of thinking that Brown I and
Brown II were sufficient to equip lower federal courts with the re-
sources to hold recalcitrant officials’ feet to the fire. And they would
have faced up to the fact that this is precisely what was required:
injunctions backed up by the coercive force of contempt sanctions.
That is, after all, what our law provides for situations like this. And
by the time Cooper v. Aaron arrived at the Supreme Court, Gover-
nor Faubus was personally bound by an injunction.133 The Court’s
assertion of judicial supremacy was dictum, as the Court itself
recognized in its opinion.134
This dictum was not only gratuitous, but harmful. The Supreme
Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron was just
a paper proclamation after the fact, when the real work was done in
Little Rock by boots on the ground before the decision. The Supreme
Court asserted judicial supremacy in the summer of 1958 only after
President Eisenhower had sent in the national guard at the begin-
ning of the school year in fall 1957. The idea that courts alone can
bring about social change through litigation is the “hollow hope”
that the definitive study of this conceit features in its title.135 And
more widely, desegregation proceeded at a snail’s pace through the
late 1950s and into the early 1960s, picking up only after Congress
and the Executive became invested.136
To this day, it remains unclear exactly what Brown v. Board of
Education actually required. Many schools remain racially segre-
gated as a matter of fact, though not due to segregation as a matter
133. See id. at 12.
134. See id. at 17 (“What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to
dispose of the case. However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor
and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case.”).
135. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
136. Id. at 70-71.
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of law. And attempts to remedy this state of affairs have served to
expose continuing rifts over what Brown actually meant. 
Consider, for example, Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, decided by the Supreme Court more
than half a century after Brown.137 A five-to-four majority of the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional, on the basis of Brown and
subsequent cases requiring strict scrutiny for racial classifications,
desegregation plans voluntarily adopted by school districts in Seat-
tle and Louisville.138 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts
quoted the lawyers in Brown and asserted that “[t]he way to stop
discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”139 Dissenting, Justice Stevens opened with the charge
that the Chief Justice’s reliance on Brown was a “cruel irony,” and
he concluded by expressing the “firm conviction” that no member of
the Supreme Court when he joined it in 1975 would have joined
with the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court.140
Most recently, the Supreme Court avoided a four-to-four deadlock
on the issue of affirmative action in higher education only by Justice
Kennedy’s execution of an about-face on the issue.141 Purporting to
apply strict scrutiny, the Court upheld by a five-to-three vote an
affirmative action program at the University of Texas that many
observers reasonably thought was doomed under the Court’s more
recent case law.142 
In addition to school desegregation, the other area of constitu-
tional law in which the Supreme Court has been most insistent on
judicial supremacy is abortion law. Almost two decades after Roe v.
Wade, a plurality of the Court asserted in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that Roe would remain the law
of the land, even while the same plurality replaced the law of Roe
with the law of Casey.143 And over two decades after Casey, the
Supreme Court still finds itself dealing with the constitutional law
of abortion.
137. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
138. See id. at 720-21.
139. Id. at 748.
140. See id. at 798, 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Compare Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2204 (2016),
with Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013).
142. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210-15.
143. See 505 U.S. 833, 845-46, 860-61, 873 (1992).
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Most recently, the Supreme Court by five-to-three vote held
unconstitutional a Texas law regulating abortion facilities as
ambulatory surgical centers and requiring abortion doctors to have
admitting privileges at local hospitals.144 Justice Breyer’s opinion for
the Court presented the decision as a straightforward application of
the “undue burden” standard newly formulated by the Court
twenty-four years earlier in Casey.145 And some journalists and
scholars described the case in the same terms.146 But these presen-
tations or descriptions work only by brushing under the rug the
contradictions and complexities of the Court’s post-Casey abortion
jurisprudence. A clearer understanding of those can be gained by
looking not at the opinions for the Court alone in those cases, but by
looking at them in conjunction with the dissenting opinions and
with the efforts of lower-court judges to apply the Court’s shifting
decisions.
The problems with the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence
cannot all be laid at the feet of judicial supremacy, of course. And
that is not the point of discussing this case law in conjunction with
the Court’s case law on race in education. The point, rather, is to
highlight the poverty of judicial supremacy as a solution to the
problem of constitutional disagreement. The Court most loudly
insists on judicial supremacy in those areas of constitutional law
where it speaks most confusingly. Like an American tourist abroad,
it is as if the Court thinks that raising its voice is a substitute for
speaking the language.
In other areas of its constitutional jurisprudence, by contrast, the
Court recognizes a distinction between what the Constitution
requires and what judicially developed doctrine has said that the
Constitution requires. The most visible is qualified immunity
jurisprudence. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects officials
“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.”147 Official action that
violates a constitutional right, accordingly, does not give rise to
144. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
145. See id. at 2309-18.
146. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When
“Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1431-32 (2016).
147. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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damages liability unless the right was “clearly established.” The
doctrine recognizes a gap between constitutional rights and that
subset of constitutional rights that are “clearly established” in
judicially elaborated doctrine. The Supreme Court has explained
qualified immunity as a function of background common law
principles in place when Congress enacted the statute, § 1983, that
provides a cause of action for violations of federally guaranteed
rights committed by individuals acting under color of state law.148
Congress did not intend to abrogate those background protections
from liability, says the Court.149 This use of judicial doctrine inter-
preting the Constitution—as distinct from constitutional rights
considered in themselves—can be understood as an example of
judicial departmentalism in action.
One area of substantive constitutional law that would admittedly
need to be revisited with a shift from judicial supremacy to judicial
departmentalism is Congress’s enforcement authority under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s current
Section 5 doctrine rests upon an equation of Supreme Court doctrine
implementing the Fourteenth Amendment with the Fourteenth
Amendment itself.150 The Court has not justified that equation by
stand-alone reasoning specific to Section 5 but has instead relied on
judicial supremacy.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that Section
5 enforcement legislation must exhibit congruence and proportional-
ity between the constitutional injury to be prevented or remedied,
and the means adapted to that end—with Supreme Court doctrine
providing the substantive standards for what counts as a constitu-
tional violation.151 More specifically, the Court equated its prior
decision in Employment Division v. Smith with the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause.152 That equation is a hallmark of judicial su-
premacy.
148. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383-84, 387-89 (2012).
149. Id. at 389.
150. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 534 (“The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing
a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general
regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the
Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.”).
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In Boerne, the Court reasoned that Congress should not be per-
mitted to arrogate enforcement authority to itself by using inde-
pendent interpretive authority to determine what Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires and permits. The Court contrasted
its “remedial” approach to Section 5 enforcement power with a
“substantive” approach that would have enabled Congress itself to
determine what counts as a constitutional violation.153
The Court’s reasoning rests on a false dichotomy. As Professor
Michael McConnell has argued, the Court’s forced choice between
a “substantive” and a “remedial” understanding of Congress’s Sec-
tion 5 power neglects an intermediate “interpretive” approach.154
When evaluating the constitutionality of an exercise of Congress’s
Section 5 power under this “interpretive” approach, the question for
the Court would not be “whether Congress is enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment as construed by the Court, but whether it is
enforcing a reasonable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”155 Professor McConnell analogizes this type of interpretive
authority to the range permitted by the Chevron doctrine.156 Another
analogy is the leeway that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires federal courts to provide
when reviewing state court applications of Supreme Court doctrine
in considering petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.157
Notice how judicial departmentalism provides a framework for
this “interpretive” approach. A judicial departmentalist approach
could have underwritten an understanding of Smith as shaped by
considerations of judicial role and concerns about judicial compe-
tence. A departmentalist Justice would have been open to the
argument that Smith’s doctrinal implementation of the Free
153. Id. at 532 (“RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.”).
154. See Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 170-74 (1997).
155. Id. at 171.
156. Id. at 184 (“An analogy might be drawn to the Chevron doctrine, which holds that
courts should not overturn agency interpretations of their governing statutes as long as they
are within a reasonable range of interpretations of the statutory language. The underlying
assumption is that the Constitution is designed to place outer bounds on government activi-
ty—not to impose a single ‘right answer’—and that ambiguities of language are a form of dele-
gation to the body entrusted with the power to effectuate the law.” (footnotes omitted)).
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
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Exercise Clause was just that—an implementation, rather than an
interpretation—and very well could be an implementation that
underenforces the best interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
The fit of Professor McConnell’s interpretive approach and judi-
cial departmentalism is a virtue for those who recognize both as
constitutionally sound, as I do. But the interpretive approach is not
embedded in current doctrine; the remedial approach resting on
judicial supremacy is. That is not a knock-down argument against
judicial departmentalism, but it is a doctrinal problem to be ad-
dressed.
Switching from the remedial approach to the interpretive ap-
proach is certainly not the only way to accommodate Section 5
doctrine with judicial departmentalism. Another possibility is to
domesticate judicial supremacy’s equation of doctrine and meaning
to a home within the Section 5 context. While rejecting a general
extension of the equation of constitutional law doctrine and the
Constitution, the Court could limit Congress’s Section 5 enforcement
authority to the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment as con-
strued by the Court, but only for reasons specific to the maintenance
of separation of powers and federalism in the Section 5 context.
Given how ill-fitting judicial supremacy is with the other doctrines
defining the binding nature of judicial determinations, some
domestication of Section 5’s reliance to that doctrinal area would at
least be legally appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Judicial supremacy exercises a distorting effect on all of consti-
tutional law. But replacing judicial supremacy with judicial depart-
mentalism would not require substantial change to substantive
constitutional doctrine. The direct effects of removing judicial
supremacy from constitutional law are limited to Section 5 doctrine.
Yet the indirect effects of adopting judicial departmentalism would
be substantial. How judges think about what they are doing when
they decide questions of constitutional law matters to what they
decide.
Judicial departmentalism counsels judges to think about what
they are doing as resolving cases and controversies between parties
while expounding constitutional law for application within the
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judicial department. It counsels against equating what the Supreme
Court says about the Constitution with the Constitution itself.
Judges who follow this counsel will not be judicial supremacists—at
least as that term is commonly understood now. But the supremacy
their decisions command will be distinctively judicial. And that is
just as it should be, both within and without the judicial depart-
ment.
